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DID ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS FAIL US?
During the last 50 years, unfortunately, the claims of what economics 
as a science considered rational, logical and manageable and the econo-
mists thought that they understood the underlying economic processes have 
been proven false by economic realities. Recession that has affl icted the glo-
bal economy during the last fi ve years has placed both economics and the 
economists amid fi re. It is being said that the neoclassical economics of the 
post-war years failed lead to the promised sustained economic growth. The 
economists have misread the business cycles and are thus dumbfounded. 
They do not know how and when the world economies would recover. The 
failures on both fronts have provoked a severe lack of confi dence in the va-
lidity of economic theories and the economists have been branded incompe-
tent and useless. 
The authors, in the following pages, intend to refl ect upon some of the 
related issues and express their opinion.     
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its deserving respect under severe conditions. While total stock of knowledge is 
accumulated, every science becomes a systematised record of its evolution. In each 
science, theories emerge and most are based upon certain fundamental laws and 
pre-suppositions. Scientists develop their own logic of interpretation of outcomes 
based on cause and effect relationship. Over a span of time, theories die, evolve 
and reincarnate. Economics is no exception to it.
Since ancient times, philosophers have devoted attention to the economic 
well-being of the society. They have devoted attention to the then existing eco-
nomic and social problems and devised principles and policies. Economics, as we 
know it in modern context, stems from the grafting of ideas and laws generated 
by the Classical economists. Since then, though the times have changed, the fun-
damental economic problems have not. Economics since Adam Smith has come a 
long way. It has evolved, become sophisticated, technical and professional. In its 
process of evolution as a modern science, it as such, in the past, has been put to test 
and its successes were acclaimed while failures invited serious criticisms. This is 
exactly what is happening now. 
Since the fi nancial crisis of 2007/08, a shadow of doubt in the effi ciency of 
science and competence of professionals is being caste. The confi dence of public, 
politicians and the professionals themselves has been badly shaken. It seems that 
economics and economists both have failed us? Let us examine the issue. Accord-
ingly, we try to examine the:
• nature and causes of current economic crisis;
• failures of economic science; and
• the role of the professionals.
Why Economic Crisis?
Time and again, the world has said ‘Never Again!’ But it has happened again 
and again! Depressions and the following crises had become a normal feature of 
our economic history. Let us mention that over the last 300 years serious economic 
depressions hit the world in 1820s, 1870s, 1880s, 1920s, 1970s, 1990s, and then in 
20081. Noteworthy is the fact that every time the intensity of the economic misery 
and pain these affl icted was different.
1 Just to remind us, in case of the present crisis, the real panic started on 7th September 
2008 and lasted for 10 days. Let us have a hurried reminder on the sequence of events. A long 
dwelling slump in the US housing market due to the lack of availability of funds to the prospective 
buyers, the market took toll of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae (to be hurriedly salvaged by the US 
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It is almost six years now that major industrial economies are in deep re-
cession, and economic growth in the developed world is dramatically slow. It is 
claimed that the developed world has landed into a defl ationary gap and a course 
of recovery is failing. Fire fi ghting has become the order of the day. Time has 
come that we recognise the root causes for the crisis and then embark on a pro-
found reform of the global economic governance system.
To be sure, the drivers of this crisis are more complex than simplistic expla-
nations pointing alleged government failure suggests. Neither too much liquidity 
as the result of expansionary monetary policy in the US, nor a global savings glut 
does explain the breakdown of the fi nancial system, so nor does the individual mis-
behaviour. No doubt, without greed of too many agents to squeeze double digits 
profi t out of an economic system that grows only in single digits, the crisis would 
not have erupted with such a force. But good policies should have anticipated, as 
Allen Greenspan acknowledges that he missed that human beings can be greedy 
and short sighted. The sudden unfolding of speculative positions in practically 
all segments of the fi nancial markets was triggered by the bursting of US hous-
ing price bubble, but these bubbles were unsustainable and had to burst sooner or 
later. For policy makers who should have known better to now assert that greed 
ran amok or that regulators were simply asleep at the wheel is simply not enough.
Financial deregulation driven by an ideological belief in the virtue of the 
market has allowed ‘innovation’2 of fi nancial instruments that are completely de-
tached from productive activities in the real sector of the economy (Davidson, 
Treasury). While the stock markets collapsed, Lehman Brothers (declared bankruptcy), Merryl 
Lynch, Bank of America, AIG (borrowed heavily from the government), corporation like Chrysler, 
General Motors took government refuge, and many became bankrupt. The bankruptcy of Iceland 
banks alarmed the impending fi nancial crisis in the UK. It not only led to a collapse of some small 
banks and the government takeover of the Royal Bank of Scotland, but was followed by a formal 
acknowledgement by the government that the country is in deep recession. Soon, French, German 
and other EU countries started crafting anti-recessionary programmes and promising government 
support to banks and large corporations. Swiss banks suffered heavy losses. Rising economies 
Russia, China, India revised their GDP growth targets. Hurried meetings of the G-8, G-20 pledged 
joint support to sustain the shock. While, early November 2009, Germany, France, and US leaders 
declared the end of recession and mild recovery, later on 26 November 2009 Dubai Inc. declared 
default on payment of with 67 billion US$ sending new shock waves to the world markets. Has the 
global economic crisis bottomed out? We are not so sure.
2 For the past two decades, fi nancial innovations were promoted and protected with scant 
regard for the downside risks. The most serious fi nancial crisis since the Great Depression, the de 
facto nationalization of a large fraction of the US fi nancial system, and the deepest global recession 
since WW II have caused doubts on the assumptions that led former Chairman of the Fed, Alan 
Greenspan, to acknowledge: “Although the benefi ts and costs of derivatives remain the subject of 
spirited debate, the performance of the economy and the fi nancial system in recent years suggests 
that those benefi ts have materially exceeded the costs”, (Remark made at the Conference of Bank 
Structure and Competition, Chicago, 8 May 2003).
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2008). Such instruments favoured speculative activities that were built on convinc-
ing information, which in reality was nothing more than an extrapolation of trends 
into the future. Many agents disposing of large amounts of – frequently borrowed 
– money bet on the same plausible outcome (such as steadily rising prices of real 
estate, oil, stocks or currencies).
Contrary to the mainstream view in the theoretical literature in economics, 
speculation of this kind is not stabilising. On the contrary, it destabilises prices. 
As the true prices can not possibly be known in a world characterised by objective 
uncertainty, the key condition for stabilising speculation is not met. Expectations 
about long-term price trends must sooner or later hit the wall of reality, because 
funds were not invested in the productive system of the economies. When the op-
timism of fi nancial markets meets the reality of the slow growing real economy, 
an adjustment of exaggerated expectations of actors in the fi nancial market is im-
minent.
In such a situation, the performance of the ‘real sector’ is largely determined 
by the size of outstanding debt: the more the economic agents have been directly 
involved in speculative activities with borrowed funds, greater is pain of the pro-
cess of adjusting the level of borrowing to diminished returns. As debtors try to 
improve their fi nancial position by selling assets and reducing expenditure, they 
drive asset prices down, cutting deeply in profi ts of companies and driving new 
debt-defl ation (Fisher, 1933, Keen, 2011) elsewhere. This can lead to defl ation of 
prices of goods and services as it constraints the ability to consume and to invest in 
the economy. The only way out is government intervention to stabilise the system 
(De Grauwe 2009).
It is instructive to recall the end of Bretton Wood’s system, under which 
the world has enjoyed two decades of prosperity and fi nancial stability after the 
WWII. Since then, the frequency and size of the imbalances and of fi nancial cri-
sis in the world economy have greatly increased, culminating the current one. 
Since current-account imbalances are mirrored by capital-account imbalances, 
they serve to spread quickly the fi nancial crisis across countries. Countries with a 
current-account surplus have to credit the differences between their export revenue 
and their import expenditure to defi cit countries, in one form or other. Financial 
losses in the defi cit countries feed back to the surplus countries and imperil their 
fi nancial system. In view of the lack of international fi nancial governance, this 
channel has shown an enormous capacity of contagion (Folkerts-Landau et al., 
2004). Another reason for growing imbalances is movements of relative prices in 
traded goods as a result of speculation in currency and fi nancial markets, disturb-
ing the exchange rates (UNCTAD, 2009).
The growing disconnection of the movements of nominal exchange rates with 
the ‘infl ation differential’ between countries has been a main cause of the growing 
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global imbalance. For increased economic welfare to be sustainable, it has to be 
shared without altering the relative competitive positions of the countries. This is 
what J. M. Keynes defi ned as the transfer problem; and it is valid to date (Keynes, 
1930).    
In addition to all these factors, overshooting of commodity prices led to the 
emergence of very large current-account surpluses in commodity exporting coun-
tries during 2000-05. When the correction came, the situation of many commod-
ity producers rapidly deteriorated. There is growing evidence that fi nancialization 
of commodities futures markets have played an important role in the scale and 
degree of market volatility.
It is evident now that the global fi nancial crisis arose amidst the failure of the 
international community to provide the globalized economy with credible global 
rules, especially with regard to international fi nancial dealings and macroeconom-
ic policies. Further, the crisis has made it all too clear that globalization of trade 
and fi nance calls for global cooperation, regulation and reviving multilateralism. 
The tendency of many governments to entrust to fi nancial market again the role of 
judge or jury in the reform process would be inappropriate. The problem of exces-
sive speculative fi nancial activity has to be tackled in an integrated fashion. 
Evidently, it follows that market and fundamental laissez faire policies as 
suggested by the economists over the last two decades have dramatically failed 
the test. Financial deregulation created the build-up of huge risky positions whose 
unwinding has pushed the global economy into a debt defl ation that can only be 
countered by government debt infl ation. The most important task thus is to break 
the spiral of falling asset prices and falling demand and to revive the fi nancial 
sector’s ability to provide credit for productive investment, to stimulate economic 
growth and avoid defl ation of prices.
Due to blind faith in the effi ciency of deregulated fi nancial markets and ab-
sence of a cooperative fi nancial and monetary system, an illusion of risk-free prof-
its and licensed profl igacy through speculative fi nances was created in many areas. 
This systematic failure can only be remedied through comprehensive reform and 
regulation with a vigorous role by governments. Contrary to traditional views, 
governments are well positioned to judge price movements in those markets that 
are driven by fi nancial speculation and should not hesitate to intervene whenever 
major disequilibria loom.
As the growing role and weight of large-scale fi nancial investors on commod-
ity futures markets have affected commodity prices and their volatility, speculative 
bubbles have emerged for some commodities during the boom and have burst after 
the US sub-prime shock. Regulators need access to more comprehensive trading 
information to understand the moving prices and intervene if problematic. There 
is a need to seal the ‘excessive speculation’.
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Finally, the absence of a cooperative international system to manage exchange 
rate fl uctuations has facilitated rampant currency speculation and increased the 
global imbalances. Thus, multilateral or even global exchange rate arrangements 
are urgently needed to maintain global stability, to avoid the collapse of the in-
ternational trading system and to pre-empt pro-cyclical policies by crisis-stricken 
countries.
Economics
It remains an undisputed fact that Professor Alfred Marshall is a legendary 
fi gure in economic literature to who goes the credit for economics became an in-
dependent academic discipline in university education throughout the world3. His 
unending enthusiasm in struggling for the cause – in the Cambridge University 
Senate and outside it – was well felt. It was his Principles of Economics (Marshall, 
1890) that made the discipline a popular subject of study in the universities (from 
1920s on) world over. Unfortunately, today just in less than a hundred years from 
its initiation, we are facing the crisis of economic science that is being loudly ech-
oed in its criticisms viz. economics failed us; it is a useless and unreliable science; 
economists are incompetent people and poor specialists, etc.
Now, let us not over-react to such criticisms. To the current fi nancial crisis, 
state of economic affairs and the current pessimism in economics, hopefully, John 
Maynard Keynes would have once again reacted in the same way as he did by re-
peating to his students in his Madrid lecture of 19304. He said:
“We are suffering just now from a bad attack of economic pessimism”.
… “I believe that this is a wildly mistaken interpretation of what is happening to 
us. We are suffering, not from the rheumatics of old age, but from the growing pains of 
over-rapid changes, from the painfulness of readjustment between one economic pe-
riod and another. The increase of technical effi ciency has been taking place faster than 
we can deal with the problem of labour absorption; the improvement in the standard of 
life has been a little too quick; the banking and monetary system of the world has been 
preventing the rate of interest from falling as fast as equilibrium requires.” 
“The prevailing world depression the enormous anomaly of unemployment 
in a world full of wants, the disastrous mistakes we have made, blind us to what is 
3  P. Groenewagen (1995), The Soaring Eagle: Alfred Marshall 1842-1924, : Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar.
4  ‘Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren’, (1930) included later in his (1931), Essays 
in Persuasion, New York: Norton, 1963 pp. 358-373. 
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going on under the surface to the true interpretation...of the trend of things. For I 
predict that both of the two opposed errors of pessimism which now make so much 
noise in the world will be proved wrong in our own time – the pessimism of the 
revolutionaries who think that things are so bad that nothing can save us but violent 
change, and the pessimism of the reactionaries who consider the balance of our eco-
nomic and social life so precarious that we must risk no experiments.”
“...do not let us overestimate the importance of the economic problem, or sac-
rifi ce to its supposed necessities other matters of greater and more permanent sig-
nifi cance. It should be a matter for specialists like dentistry.” (J. M. Keynes, 1931)
Today, we can well endorse the above statement of Keynes with a minor 
change in his vision of specialists i.e. “economists might one day be thought as 
humble competent people, on a level with dentists”. Note, since then, fl uoridation, 
better oral health, and sealants have contributed to reductions in the demand for, 
and the supply of dentists. Can we hope for such preventive breakthroughs in eco-
nomics? Probably, Yes!
Pessimism in our science has a history. In last quarter century, on one hand, 
to no ones surprise, the classical teaching of economics slowly started withering 
away even in the most prestigious universities and on the other in the US, Europe 
and Asia in 1990s and 2000s there was a strong surge in admissions to the Busi-
ness Schools at the cost of economics. 
Sadly enough, economic science is ailing today. As the doubts in the forecast-
ing accuracy of economics grew, the interest of researchers in general econom-
ics gradually declined. Inside company research became popular. Moreover, the 
scepticism of 1980s grew and engulfed the entire economic forecasting activity. 
Many companies disbanded their forecasting units and independent forecasting 
economic consultancies vanished. Economics, as a science, was branded unreli-
able and the economists as poor. Naturally, after twenty or so years we are asking 
ourselves as to what has happened to economics.
Since 1990s, the confi dence of American, Japanese and West European cor-
porations in the economic forecasts has been badly shaken, because even with the 
help of computerised models, the economists had failed to foresee the stagfl ation 
of the 1970s and the cyclical trends of the 1980s. The confi dence further depleted 
in the usefulness of economics as a science for the experts did not accurately 
predict the consumption pattern of the households or the fi rms. In the mid 1990s 
some big multinationals in the US started fi ring their crystal bowl watchers5. The 
5  General Electric, a giant corporation that earned revenue of some 70 billion in 1996 did not 
employ even a single economist. IBM fi red its ‘team of economists’ in favour of good ‘portfolio and 
risk managers’, because as one spokesperson said, ‘it is much cheaper for us’. Soon company experts 
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Swedish Academy of Sciences too recognised this shifting course in economics 
by awarding the 1990 Nobel Prize to Harvey Markovitz, Merton Miller, and Wil-
liam Sharpe. But, this was of little help as later, the failure of their fi nancial model 
contributed to huge losses at the stock market, damaging not only the shareholders 
but also the reputation of the Prize. Somebody must have regretted in Swedish 
Academy! 
Note that the macroeconomic models of the 1930s were based on consump-
tion and saving/investment equations. The year following the WWII, were the 
‘golden years’ for such models. For two decades the world recorded high economic 
growth rates, but in the 1970s the high hopes were watered down when these 
models could not foresee the repercussions of the explosive hikes in oil prices. The 
mainframe computers were fed with ‘known’ and ‘unknown’ parameters to pro-
duce equations that could be used in justifi cation of proposed growth policies. One 
worthy author of such models Lawrence Klein won a Nobel Prize for his model in 
1980. These models were designed to simulate faster sustained economic growth 
of the developed western economies6, which never came through.
In the wake of the current crisis economics has defi nitely failed us. In past 
ten years it has provoked a lack of confi dence in validity of its theories. It is being 
said that few economic bubbles have burst more spectacularly than the reputation 
of economics as a science. In the wake of biggest economic shake-up in 80 years 
its reputation has taken the beating. While Paul Krugman argued that much of the 
macroeconomics of the past 30 years was spectacularly useless at best and posi-
tively harmful at worst ; Barry Eichengreen went on to say that current economic 
turmoil has cast in doubt much of what we thought we knew about economics. 
Lately, some enthusiasts (Keen, 2011 and others) are trying to uproot post-war 
neoclassical economics by arguing that it is ‘profoundly wrong’ and if the ‘real 
world were accurately described by economic text books, there would not now be 
a fi nancial crisis’.
Two central parts of the discipline – macroeconomics and fi nancial econom-
ics – are now being put to serious re-examination. The attack is directed on three 
major fronts: that macro and fi nancial macroeconomics helped cause the banking 
crisis, that it failed to foresee and stop it, and that economists have no idea how to 
fi x it. 
While the economists, especially in the central banks, were too fi xated on 
taming infl ation and too brave about asset bubbles; fi nancial economists formal-
became more concerned with risk management, watching fi nancial derivates, hedging against price 
and interest rate fl uctuations, inventory management, etc.
6  Note that using such models in 1974 the Economic Council of the President of the United 
States enthusiastically overestimated the economic growth for 3 per cent and underestimated 
infl ation by the same percentage.
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ised theories of the effi ciency of the markets, fuelling the notion that markets 
would regulate themselves and fi nancial innovation are always good. Macroecono-
mists also had their blind spot. Their standard models assumed that capital mar-
kets work perfectly. By assuming that it is so, they were largely able to ignore the 
economy’s fi nancial plumbing. The models that ignored fi nance had little chance 
of spotting a calamity that stemmed from it. 
The Keynesian task of demand management (Keynes, 1936) outlived the 
Great Depression, becoming a routine duty of governments. They were aided by 
economic advisers who built economic models and were guided by apparent trade-
offs between infl ation and unemployment. But their credibility did not survive the 
oil price shock of the 1970s and western economies were deposed to stagfl ation 
– a situation which the Keynesian consensus grasped poorly and failed to prevent.
The mainstream macroeconomics embodied in DSGE – dynamic state gen-
eral equilibrium – models was a poor guide to the origins of fi nancial collapse. 
The conventional instruments of monetary policy proved insuffi cient. Today, some 
economists advocate a bold fi scal expansion. Evidently, economics requires a rev-
olution in techniques. Macroeconomists should turn to patient empirical spade-
work, documenting crises – past and present – in the hope that a fresh theory might 
later make sense of it all. 
On the other end, in fi nancial economics, the EMH – effi cient market hypoth-
esis – strategists claimed that their approach made the fi nancial system healthier 
and safe. This is why many people view the fi nancial crises that began in 2007-8 as 
a devastating blow to the credibility of banks but also of the academic discipline of 
fi nancial economics. The banks assumed that they can always rollover their short-
term debts or sell back mortgage backed securities. The fi nancial failures made a 
mockery of both these assumptions. Funds dried up and the markets thinned out. 
What followed was a serious rush for cash, and the growing fi nancial bubble had 
fi nally burst. 
Macroeconomists split – into purists and pragmatists – drawing opposite 
messages from the episode. The purists blamed the stagfl ation on restless central 
banks trying too hard and the pragmatists that markets malfunction, wages fail to 
adjust and prices are sticky. For two decades after 1982 the two schools converged 
into the new synthesis that fl owed from universities to central banks. It underlay 
the doctrine of infl ation targeting.
However, the fragile consensus of monetary/fi scal policies was blown apart. 
With their compromise tools useless, both sides have retreated to their roots. 
Keynesians have become uncritical of fi scal stimulus; and even with zero short 
term interest rates and banking troubles on hand, monetary policy works less 
well. Naturally, there is a clear case for reinvention. Just as the Great Depression 
spawned Keynesianism; stagfl ation of 1970s fuelled Monetarism; now the Schum-
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peterian ‘creative destruction’ is underway. May be we come up with a new eco-
nomics. Further, it is true that current economic crisis has exposed bitter divisions 
among the economists; many people in the profession still believe that it could be 
good for economics. 
However, we must remind that the troubles of economics are purely meth-
odological issues and it is in this context that these should be addressed. The gen-
eral technique to study the works of economists and philosophers which develop, 
apply, and discuss the theory is to rely on the tentative results of contemporary 
economics and on initial judg ments concerning the nature and worth of theories 
and economics as a disci pline. We should acknowledge that the dis cus sions of eco-
nomic issues are often biased and distorted because of their importance to inter-
ests of individuals and social groups. Economists can, however, address a broader 
audi ence and a wider spectrum of issues if they do not start by taking them as the 
paradigm for what economics should be. Economics must thus struggle to avoid 
becoming apolo getics for any school of economics. 
History is a witness that, usually, the business cycles have been followed by 
the reassessments of the economic science. Deep recessions have been followed 
by negation of the existing orthodoxies giving way to the new. As more than over 
a century ago, as now, many of us feel that the glaring lack of consensus on fun-
damental principles compromised the scientifi c status of economics, and there are 
strong professional and public pressures to establish a new orthodoxy that could 
speak authoritatively on economic matters.
The Economist
Economists talk about their own work in many ways. They write, for exam-
ple, about principles, models, theories, assumptions, and defi ni tions and make use 
of previous work by epistemologists and philosophers of sci ence. An economic 
scientist studying economic theory is in the same philosophi cal position as any 
empirical philosopher of sci ence seeking knowledge of sciences. Economists need 
to trim, revise, and even in vent philosophical categories in trying to make sense of 
economic theory.
Now let us now redeem who is an economist in practice? What he does? 
Is he someone a social philosopher like Adam Smith or an analyst and teacher 
like Alfred Marshall or a dentist of Keynes’s dream? To us, it seems that modern 
economist is none of the said sort. It appears that he is someone – with a little bit 
of everything – a theoretician, observer/researcher, analyst, diagnostician, policy 
designer and sometimes one who gets involved into policy implementation. Evi-
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dently, such a person would have to be an intellectual giant and could exist only 
in our minds.
Keynes in his remark on the role of the future of economists was rather scep-
tic as he thought that economists could manage to get themselves thought of a 
humble, complete people, on a level with dentists. If so, he said, that would be 
splendid! Alas, even after eighty years of this remark that has not happened. To-
day, economists have either been reduced to pure theorists – academics caged in 
prestigious university campuses, some receiving the Nobel Prize for their theoreti-
cal contributions, or the massive number holding graduate degrees in economics 
and business working for state or private employers doing routine work for which 
no higher education in economics is necessary. 
Economists too have failed us because except a few, to our regret, the vast 
majority is neither well averse with real economics nor is able to use the acquired 
knowledge in appropriate manner. Professional economists have been to their 
desks doing some routine statistical analyses or designing models of little use. 
Evidently, we have reached nowhere close to Keynes’s dream. 
Personally, we would like to see our fellow economists of the future in the 
role of a mechanics – knowledgeable, well-equipped with plenty of analytical tools 
in their tool-boxes, capable of fi xing the defects in the economic system7. We see 
him well aware of economic doctrine, fi nance, economic history, mathematics and 
philosophy. We see them talented in understanding the socio-psychological reac-
tions of the people in face of the economic trends and capable of using appropriate 
analytical tools. Since, the economic system by nature, like an old car, is prone to 
frequent breakdowns and cyclical fl uctuations, their role as constructor and repair-
er is of utmost priority. For such a role, we visualise an apprenticeship in places 
where economic policy is evolved.
Since, the 1970s, unfortunately, in the academia, the pressure for jobs, pro-
motion, tenure and publications has grown so such that the economists had to 
cultivate ever narrower fi elds. The slogan became publish or perish. The result was 
that the economics students were trained to become narrow specialists even with-
out understanding the institutions, the economic thought, the economic literature, 
the handling and evaluation of quantitative and qualitative data, learning to weigh 
evidence, and without wider visions.
We are confi dent that we do not require an army of economists to run the 
economy well. A massive enrolment of students is not required in the universi-
ties, because educating an economist8 of the needed type is not going to be an 
7  Economic system should be understood as a compound of institutional framework including 
economic legislation, economic structure of the society and economic policy of the state.
8  I mean here graduate (master) and postgraduate (doctoral) education of ‘economists’ only.
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easy task. While the students will have to be gifted, the teachers would have to be 
highly qualifi ed and competent and curriculum tough. For a moment, let us not be 
misled by Keynes’s remark that the study of economics does not seem to require 
any specialised gift of an unusually high order9, instead we would like to cite and 
agree with him when he writes in his essay on Marshall that … the master econo-
mist must possess a rare combination of gifts10.
Economics requires broader knowledge. Does this broadening not mean that 
we have to sacrifi ce some education in economics that is all the time becom-
ing more and more technical, specialised, fragmented and professional? We are 
sceptic that unless we lengthen the time of study, evidently, some sacrifi ces in 
curriculum will have to be made. Scholars are saying world-wide that the special-
ist knows more and more about less and less until he knows everything about 
nothing. The real question is should a well-trained business economist deal with 
few areas or spread his investigation widely? Currently, a widely held criticism of 
modern American and European education of economics is that it has, unfortu-
nately, become too narrow and too far from reality11. The Economics Departments 
in universities are awarding degrees to generations of fach idiots - brilliant at eso-
teric mathematics yet innocent of actual economic life12. We would rather agree 
with Streeten and favour being a broad-gauged economist and vaguely right to 
being precisely wrong.13
Since J. M. Keynes published his General Theory of Employment, Interest 
and Money (1936), economics education in the Western world, particularly in the 
US, has moved far away from the tradition. Many distinguished economists in the 
1990s accepted that in the US Graduate (Master) education the tools and theory 
9  Keynes, J. M., ‘Alfred Marshall’ in his Essays in Biography, London: Macmillan (1972). 
This remark should be taken in context to the then prevailing widespread feeling among the 
university students and the public that the study of economics, compared to other sciences or law, 
does not require any pre-requirements and is easy to complete.  
10  “Is it not intellectually regarded a very easy subject compared with the higher branches of 
philosophy and pure science? Yet good or even competent, economists are the rarest of the birds”. 
He further adds, He must reach a high standard in several different directions and must combine 
talents not often found together. …. He must be mathematician, historian, statesman, philosopher 
– in some degree. He must understand symbols and speak in words. He must contemplate the par-
ticular in terms of the general, and touch abstract and concrete in the same fl ight of thought. He 
must study the present in the light of the past for the purpose of the future. No part of human nature 
or their institutions must lie entirely outside his regard. He must be purposeful and disinterested in 
a simultaneous mood; as aloof and incorruptible as an artist, yet sometimes as near the earth as a 
politician.” Ibid. 
11  Klamer, Arjo and David Colander, (1990), The Making of an Economist, Boulder: West 
View Press.
12  Kuttner, R (1986), ‘The Poverty of Economics’, Atlantic Monthly, February Issue, pp 74-84.
13  Paul Streeten, American Economics Education, Mimeo.
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are preferred at the cost of creativity and problem solving. It is also noted that 
graduate students who come from other fi elds can get Ph.Ds easily with little or no 
knowledge of economic problems and institutions of the system14. 
We feel that time has come to reverse the trend. We further believe that it 
would perhaps be right to sacrifi ce some technical aspects of economics (including 
some of mathematics) in favour of disciplines like political science, logic, sociolo-
gy, philosophy and history. Our argument in support of this is that philosophy con-
sists of logic, epistemology, moral and political philosophy. A sound knowledge 
of logic and theory of knowledge will make an economist not only good theorist 
but also teach him to distinguish between, on one hand, tautology and deductions 
from them, and on the other, empirical facts and their relation. Economics suf-
fers from mistaken validity for truth and the easy transition to falsehood that lies 
at the alleged rigour and precision of mathematical economics. Conclusions may 
be valid but untrue. Similarly, a good education in moral and political philosophy 
would avoid or at least reduce the numerous hidden biases in economic reason-
ing. The knowledge of political institutions and processes makes the economist 
aware of the constraints and opportunities for getting policies right. Economists 
need to take their investigation into the political variables in economic policy, and 
supplement positive with normative political economy, because such knowledge is 
deeply neglected in modern economics education. It hardly needs any argument 
of defence.
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JESU LI NAS EKONOMIJA I EKONOMISTI IZNEVJERILI?
Sažetak
Tijekom proteklih 50 godina, ekonomska je stvarnost pokazala da su bile  pogrešne 
tvrdnje koje je ekonomska znanost smatrala racionalnim, logičnim i razumljivim, a ekono-
misti su, pak, mislili da razumiju ekonomske procese na kojima se one zasnivaju. Recesija, 
koja je proteklih pet godina pogodila svjetsko gospodarstvo, bacila je ekonomiju i ekono-
miste usred vatre. Govori se kako neoklasična ekonomija, u poslijeratnom razdoblju, nije us-
pjela dovesti do obećanog stalnog gospodarskog rasta. Ekonomisti su pogrešno protumačili 
poslovne cikluse pa su tako ostali zatečeni. Ne znaju kako ni kada bi se gospodarstvo moglo 
oporaviti. Neuspjesi, na jednom i drugom planu, su izazvali ozbiljno nepovjerenje u valjanost 
ekonomskih teorija, a ekonomiste se proglasilo nestručnima i beskorisnima. 
Autori se u svom radu žele osvrnuti na neke probleme s tim u vezi i izraziti svoje mišljenje.
Ključne riječi: kriza, DSGE modeli, defl acija duga, fi nancijski mjehuri, fi nancijska 
deregulacija, prekomjerna štednja.
